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THE PROPER SITUS OF PUBLIC TRUSTEE
SALES
By F. W. Sanborn, Jr., of the Denver Bar
ODAY we have a very peculiar situation in Denver in
respect to the proper situs for sales now being held, and
to be held, by the Public Trustee under deeds of trust
prescribing that such sale be held at the "Tremont Street
Front Door of the Court House." A new Municipal Building stands practically ready to house all our courts and county
offices. A large number of these offices have already moved
to the new building, and the old structure is occupied only
by the various courts, the Sheriff's office and the office of the
Public Trustee and County Clerk and Recorder. No door
of the new Municipal Building faces on Tremont Street.
For many years deeds of trust executed to the Public
Trustee have had incorporated in the printed portion thereof
a provision that in the event of default, the Public Trustee
should make his sale at the "Tremont Street Front Door of
the Court House", or on the premises. It will, of course, be
only a matter of months until the old court house stands wholly
deserted and unoccupied, and only a question of a relatively
short time thereafter until this old landmark will be torn
down to make way for a more modern structure.
It is obvious to all that if there is any question at all
concerning the proper situs for a Public Trustee's sale under
such circumstances that the sale is properly held on the premises, or the deed of trust foreclosed in court as a mortgage.
However, both of these methods are inconvenient, and in the
latter case apt to be attended by delays which destroy, to some
degree at least, the security behind the deed of trust. This
paper will be confined to the legality of sales to be made at
the new Municipal Building, and the proper place at such
building for holding such sale.
There are many questions that will arise, and to anticipate them all at this time would be impossible. Two buildings are now in use. Which is the court house? The new
building is called the Municipal Building. Will it become
the "Court House" if not so designated? Will the old build-
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ing continue to be the "Court House" after the courts have
ceased to hold sessions there? The provisions of the deed of
trust are contractual. Should they be strictly enforced to require a sale at the specific place mentioned in the contract?
Would buyers at such sales naturally be expected to congregate at the Tremont Street door of the deserted building after
the new is in full use? Where should a sale take place that
is advertised at the Tremont Street door, when all county
offices pending advertisement have moved to the new structure? Is the power of sale rendered nugatory when the place
of sale named in the contract is no longer in existence? Many
of these queries have already received the attention of the
courts.
In developing this subject, I have arranged the material
geographically, rather than chronologically or according to
subject matter, as the cases practically speak for themselves.
ILLINOIS.

On October 9, 1871, the old courthouse of Cook County
was practically destroyed by the great Chicago fire, only one
wing thereof standing after the disaster. This wing, pending
and following the erection of a new courthouse upon another
site, was utilized for a part of the county offices, including the
criminal and county courts.
In the case of Waller v. Arnold, 71 11. 350 (1874), the
deed of trust, executed prior to the fire, provided for sale to
be made "at the North door of the courthouse of the County
of Cook, in the City of Chicago." At the date of the execution
of the deed of trust, the North door of the then courthouse
was fronting on Randolph Street. The new courthouse was
erected at the corner of Adams and LaSalle Streets, and had
two North doors, both fronting on Adams Street. The Trustee, undoubtedly desiring to "play safe", advertised two sales;
the first to be held January 30, 1874:
"At the East door of the two North doors on Adams Street of the court
house of the County of Cook in the City of Chicago, meaning the court house
on the comer of Adams and LaSalle Streets, the old court house having been
destroyed ;"

The second to be held January 31, 1874:
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"At the place midway in space between LaSalle and Clark Streets, in
the City of Chicago, where the North door of the old court house was, previous
to the fire,".

The appellant sought to enjoin both sales. Appellant
made the point that no sale could be made "at the place midway in space, * * * where the North door of the old court
house was, previous to the fire", because he insisted that the
destruction of the place of sale destroyed the power. His
argument was that the place of sale is one of the essential
elements of the power, and that wanting, the whole power is
rendered nugatory.
The court pointed out, however, that the objection was
not founded in fact, and hence the argument failed. One
wing of the former building still remained and was occupied
as a court house. True, the structures on the exact locality
were not as they were at the date of the execution of the deed.
The ruins were there, the place distinctly marked, and the
location of the place designated in the deed of trust was as
readily discovered as any public place in the city. The criminal and county courts were still held there, and process issued
by these courts was returnable there. The court said:
"We concede, the power to sell contained in this class of securities must
be strictly pursued, and the utmost fairness must be observed in the execution
of the power. But such strictness and literal compliance should not be exacted
as would destroy the power. This would render valueless the security
intended to be afforded.
"* * * It would be absurd to hold the power could not rightfully be
exercised at the 'north door' of a new court house, had one been erected on the
location of the one destroyed. The essential element in the power, is the place
rendered certain by the description given in the deed, and whether it is executed at the top or the foot of the steps, or whether they have been destroyed
and new ones erected, or whether there are none at all there, seems to us
wholly immaterial. The mere fact there has been a physical change in the
buildings at the point designated, ought not to be held to destroy the power.
This would be a narrow and illiberal construction, which we are unwilling
to adopt. While construing such powers strictly, they must have a reasonable
construction given to them. Greater strictness ought not to be required than
the parties, by a fair construction of the provisions of the deed, contracted
should be observed. Anything further savors of useless technicality. We
entertain no doubt whatever that the power of sale contained in this trust
deed can be well executed at the ruins of the north door of the old court
house in the city of Chicago."
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The court also pointed out that it was not essential to a
valid execution of the power given by the deed of trust that
it should be executed in or at the specific place designated in
the deed of trust, but that parties, in making their contracts,
must be presumed to have done so with reference to mutations
that must necessarily take place in all structures, however
permanently erected.
The above rule was followed by the same court in
Chandler v. White, 84 Ill. 435.
In the case of Alden v. Goldie, 82 Ill. 581 (1876), the
trust deed was executed prior to the fire of 1871, and the sale
was made subsequent to the erection of the new court house.
The notice for sale advertised a sale at the north door of the
new court house. Objection was made to the sale on the
ground that the trust deed did not authorize a sale at the place
advertised. The court said:
'It is insisted that the intention was, that the sale should be at the
north door of the then court house, at the time of the execution of the trust
deed. But the intention is to be derived from the language of the trust deed.
There is nothing in that restrictive of the place of sale to the site of the then
existing court house. But it is general, authorizing the sale 'at the north
door of the court house in said city of Chicago.' The advertisement of sale
is, at a designated north door of the court house in the city of Chicago.
"The place, as advertised, fulfills, in terms, the requirement of the trust
deed. It abundantly satisfies its true spirit and intent."

The same rule is observed in the case of Wilhelm v.
Schmidt, 84 Ill. 183 (1876).
In Gregory v. Clarke, 75 Ill. 485 (1874), the court held
that as between the two court houses in Chicago following the
fire, the proper place for holding the sale was at the new court
house, where the circuit and superior courts were held, rather
than at the old court house, which had been remodeled to the
use of the county and criminal courts.
It would appear, therefore, that under the Illinois rule,
where there was a door in the new court house that in general
terms fitted the description for place of sale in the deed of
trust, that a sale would be proper either at the old site or at
the new court house, but preferably at the new court house.
It is interesting to note, however, that the published notice
of sale was very specific in each instance, and left no doubt
in the minds of bidders as to where the sale was to take place.
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TEXAS.

Somewhat similar problems have been passed upon by the
Texas courts. Briefly, the three authorities found, held as
follows:
Williams v. Pouns, 48 Texas 141. A deed of trust requiring a sale to be made at the court house of the county is
properly executed by the sale at the court house of a newly
organized county which includes the land sold.
Hickey v. Behrens, 12 S. W. 679, (Texas 1889). Under
a deed of trust providing for a sale at the East door of the
court house, a sale at the South door is valid in the absence
of proof of injury thereby.
It should be noted in connection with this last case, however, that such a sale might not provide the purchaser with
a marketable title, in view of the fact that an aggrieved owner
of the equity might come into court after such a sale and
show injury, and thus have the sale set aside.
Miller v. Boone, 23 S. W. 574 (Texas 1893). Where
by statute "court house door" is defined as "either of the principal entrances to the house provided by proper authority for
holding of the district courts", a sale held at the door of a
house used by the commissioners and county courts was declared void where the Opera House had previous to the sale
been designated as the place for the holding of the district
court.

MISSOURI.
Missouri furnishes us with the greatest wealth of authorities on the problems before us.
The case of Hambrightv. Brockman, 59 Mo. 52 (1875),
decided at about the same time as the Illinois case of Waller
v. Arnold, supra, seems to adopt a different viewpoint. Here
the deed of trust provided for a sale "at the courthouse door
in the City of Independence." When sale was made, the court
house had been partially taken down and was undergoing repairs. The courts were held in the upper room of a building
on the public square over a bank. The Trustee on the day
of sale went to the North door of the court house and proclaimed that as the court house had been torn down to its first
story, he would sell at the front entrance of the place where
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the courts were then held at "Bank Hall". The court, in
holding that the sale was properly held at the place where
the courts were temporarily held and not at the court house,
said:
"The object of such deeds, as the object of our law on the subject of
execution sales, is to secure a sale at a public place, and when a court house is
mentioned, it is obviously designed to designate the building where courts are
held, and where the people attending such courts are supposed to congregate.
If the court house, established at the time the deed is made, is burned down
or in such a dilapidated condition that no court is held there, the object of
publicity would not be attained by selling at the deserted spot where such.
building had stood. In this case the sale was made at the door of the building
temporarily used as a court house, during the sessions of the court therein, and
this holding to all intents and purposes constituted the building a court house
and the court house of Jackson County at that time."

In Napton v. Hurt, 70 Mo. 497 (1879), the deed of trust
provided for sale at "the West door of the courthouse." Subsequent to the execution of the trust deed, the court house was
moved and had been by law established at a new locality and
there was no West door. The trustee advertised his sale for
the new court house door. The court held that the Trustee
must sell at the new place and not at the old, and cited with
approval the case of Hambright v. Brockman, supra.
In Davis v. Hess, 15 S. W. 324 (Mo. 1891 ), the trust deed
provided for sale "at the courthouse door", but at the date
of execution there was no court house proper, the old one
having been removed. At the date of sale a new court house
was in the course of construction on the site formerly occupied
by the former county building, and the courts were being held
in a Church, while other county offices were scattered about
the court house square. The sale was well attended and made
at the new, but unfinished, building. In approving the place
of sale, the court said:
"Sales under powers contained in mortgages and deeds of trust have
always been regarded by this court as a harsh method of cutting off the equity
of redemption, and hence it has been held that the utmost fairness must be
observed in the execution of such powers. But, as said in Waller v. Arnold,
71 I1l. 350, such strictness and literal compliance should not be exacted as
will destroy the power. This would render valueless the security intended
to be afforded. These parties intended there should be a sale upon the contingencies named, and they fixed the court-house door as the place where it
should take place. In ascertaining this place, we must look to the circum-
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stances as they existed at the date of the sales. In doing this, we do not see
how a person in search of the place named in the deed of trust could be misled.
With a church building used by the county for a few weeks in the year for
holding the circuit court only, the county officers scattered around in different
buildings, and a structure erected on the public square expressly for a courthouse, we think no one would hesitate in calling the latter the court-house
within the meaning of the deeds of trust, though not yet completed."

From the above case, it might be thought that a "court
house" is not necessarily a place where the courts are, at the
time, held, but that what is meant by the "court house" must
be determined by the circumstances in each case. Who would
question that the new "Municipal Building" will be the
"court house" after it comes into full use for practically all
county purposes?
We now come to the best considered of the reported cases,
the case of Stewart v. Brown, 20 S. W. 451 (Mo. 1892). The
Trust deed provided for sale at "the East courthouse door of
the City of St. Joseph." When the Trust Deed was executed
the courthouse was situated between Fourth and Fifth Streets.
In 1885 the courthouse was partially destroyed by fire, and
at the date of the sale the circuit court was held on the third
floor of a building situated on the Northwest corner of Sixth
and Francis Streets, and the county and probate courts were
held in a building situated on the Northeast corner of Second
and St. Charles Streets. These buildings were not near to
one another, nor near the partially destroyed courthouse. The
trustee in his published notice stated he would sell "at the
front door of the courthouse in the City of St. Joseph", and
he sold the same "At the front or north door, that led upstairs
to the part of building occupied by the circuit court when in
session, on the corner of Sixth and St. Francis Streets." The
circuit court was not in session on the day of sale. The lower
court held that the sale as made was good. On appeal the
Supreme Court, in a department decision found in 16 S. W.
at page 389 (1891), held that the sale was void and that the
sale should have taken place "at the east door of the old
courthouse." The court said:
"The deed of trust must be read in the light of the circumstances as
they existed at its date, and when it designates the place of sale by a particular
door of the house it locates that place as specifically as if it had mentioned
the particular block of ground. * * * In this case the parties did not stop with
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the words 'court-house door' or any such general words, but they go on, and
fix the particular door of the court-house, thus making the place specific. To
hold otherwise is to say that the parties assumed that the county would always
have a court house with an east door. * * "
'A court-house may be a place where a court or courts only are held,
but that is not the sense in which the words are generally used when applied
to our county houses, for they generally signify a building where all of the
county affairs are or are designated to be transacted. A 'court-house' may,
under some circumstances, be an incompleted building, not yet used for holding
courts or occupied by any county officer, within the meaning of a deed of
trust. Davis v. Hess (Mo.) 15 S. W. 324. Looking to the circumstances
* * * we think the building, and the only one, which could be called the
'court house' within the meaning of the deed of trust, was the building which
was partially destroyed by fire."

Although not clear from the reported cases, a rehearing
was apparently granted and in an en banc decision a divided
court modified its previous decision, and, while holding that
the sale was void for lack of definiteness in the advertised
place of sale, held that under ordinary circumstances the
proper place of sale would not be the old courthouse, but that
place in use as a court house at the time of sale. Justice
Thomas, who wrote the majority opinion, approves that part
of the former decision reading:
"The place where these sales under deeds of trust given to secure debts
must be made depends upon the terms of the deed of trust. Such sales may
be made at any place agreed upon by the parties. Nor is it necessary that they
should be made during the session of a court, as is the case in sales under
executions. The place of sale, like the power of sale itself, is a matter of
contract; and it follows that in determining the place of sale we must look
to the intention of the parties as expressed in the deed of trust. It is to the
intention thus expressed that the purchaser must look, for the trustee has no
right to deviate from the expressed terms of sale, and, if he fails to make the
sale at the designated place, it will not cut off the equity of redemption."

Thomas, after reviewing a number of cases on the subject,
many of which have already been cited, states that in view
of the prior decisions in Missouri, a rule of property had been
established validating sales at the courthouse in use at the
time of such sale, saying:
"The deed of trust * * * is to be construed as if it contained the
proviso that, in case the then courthouse should be abandoned as a courthouse or destroyed, the sale of the trustee might be made at the door of the
courthouse existing at the time of the sale, * * * No evil, in our view, either
great or small, can proceed from a sale of land under powers contained in
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mortgages at the courthouse door, wherever that may be, provided the notice
specifically designates the place of sale. Courthouses are places of public resort,

and there are many reasons why auction sales should occur there. * * * It
would have been manifestly more appropriate to have sold the property at
the door of the building in which the circuit court was held than to have
sold it at the east door of a building once used as a courthouse, but then
partially destroyed by fire, and utterly abandoned as a courthouse. The
former was a public resort, where such sales usually occur, while the latter
was not."

Chief Justice Sherwood, in a special concurring opinion,
says :
"* * * Where parties draw up a deed of trust they contemplate that

a default in payment may occur, and so they provide for a place of sale in
the event of such default. They designate a place of sale, but with that idea
of locality they couple the idea of publicity, and, as the court-house--the
place where circuit and other courts are held-is usually the place par excellence where bidders and buyers do most congregate, they provide that the
sale shall occur there, at the building used for that purpose; in a word, use is
as potent a factor, or even more so, than locality. If the building then used
for the purposes of a court-house have several doors, designation is made of
the door where such sales are accustomed to occur, so that where the 'east
door' or the 'west door' of the courthouse is thus designated it is only equivalent to saying that the sale contemplated shall occur-First, at the courthouse; and, Second, at that particular point 'at the court-house where such
sales are usually made.' But suppose the court-house be wholly or partially
destroyed, or become so dilapidated as to be unfit to use and to require repair,
or be removed by law to another locality, or, owing to changes made in the
building itself, the designated 'east' or 'west' door is bricked up, and another
opening made. What then? Does any one of the facts aforesaid cause the
power of sale vested in the trustee to lapse? By no means, unless restrictive
words are used, showing a determination to confine the sale to the specified
locality,-to the then court-house; otherwise the law will presume that the
contracting parties so drafted the instrument that it would cover any of the
contingencies named, of destruction, of dilapidation, and consequent repair,
or of removal by operation of law, or of change in the structure of the building. The law is practical, and presumes that parties employing its forms to
secure and enforce individual rights will be equally practical in contemplating
matters which, in the course of human events, are not unlikely to happen.
Take, for instance, the case of a courthouse built on the banks of the alluvial
soil of the Missouri River. A flood sweeps away the soil on which it rests,
and it falls into the turbid waters. In such case the very locality, to all
intents and purposes, is gone, and another building is selected or erected for
a court-house, and courts, as at the old one, are held there. Can it be possible
that the trustee, in order to make a valid sale, would have to proceed to the
site of the original court-house in a flatboat, and there make the sale? Such
would certainly be the case if the idea of locality alone is to control. The
new location would still fill the requirements of the deed. It would be 'the
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court-house;' and, even if the deed should require a sale at the 'east door' of
the court-house, and the building selected should have no 'east door', this
would not invalidate the sale, provided that the sale should occur at the only
door of such a building as the deed of trust mentions."

As Judge Barclay pointed out in a special opinion in this
case, when there is any question as to procedure, it is always
well to institute foreclosure proceedings in court.
The rule announced in the above case was followed in
Snyder v. Chicago Ry., 33 S. W. 67 (Mo. 1895).
The case of Riggs v. Owen, 25 S. W. 356 (Mo. 1894),
follows the above case, the court saying:
"We consider it settled that when a building is selected and occupied
by the proper authorities as and for a courthouse, when the courthouse proper
is destroyed, or is abandoned for any good cause, a sale required by a deed of
trust to be made at the courthouse door may be made at such temporary
courthouse so selected. Hambright v. Brockman, 59 Mo. 52; Napton v.
Hurt, 70 Mo. 497; Stewart v. Brown, 112 Mo. 171, 20 S. W. 451. The
sale in this case was made at the only door of the building so selected, so far
as disclosed by the evidence, and we think was a compliance with the stipulation of the deed in this respect."

In Gray v. Worst, 31 S. W. 585 (Mo. 1895), where there
were two courthouses in the county, and the trust deed provided for sale at the "door of the courthouse", one courthouse
being at the county seat, the court held that the sale was
properly held at the courthouse at the county seat.
The Missouri authorities, therefore, seem to hold that,
where the new building is in use, either permanently or temporarily, as the place where the courts of general jurisdiction
hold their sessions, that it is ordinarily the duty of the Trustee
to hold his sale at the new place. It is interesting to note, however, that these courts also place great stress upon the published notice of sale. There is no doubt but that such notice
must be definite and specific as to just where the sale is to be
held.
GEORGIA.

The Georgia Supreme Court has followed the majority
rule in the case of Payton v. McPhaul, 58 S. E. 50, (Ga. 1907).
The mortgage, with power of sale, provided that in event
of default, the mortgagee was authorized to advertise and sell
the property "before the courthouse door in the Town of
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Isabella, Ga., four weeks' notice of such sale being made by
publication in a newspaper published in the town of Sylvester;" At the time the mortgage was executed the county site
of Worth County was the town of Isabella. At the time the
power of sale was exercised the county site was at the City of
Sylvester. The court, in approving the sale at the courthouse
at the time of sale, said:
"The power of sale in a mortgage must be construed like other parts of
the contract, so as to effectuate the intention of the parties; and this is true
as to the place of sale, as well as in regard to the other stipulations in the
power. There are numerous cases dealing with the question as to the validity
of sales where, for some reason, the place of sale, as indicated by the strict
terms of the power, was not chosen as the place of sale on account of events
transpiring between the date of the execution of the instrument and the date
that the power was exercised. When the power provides that the sale shall
be at the courthouse door, the rebuilding, removal, destruction, or temporary
abandonment of the building raises a doubt as to where the sale should be had
under the power. The general rule is that, where the door of the courthouse
is designated as the place of sale, the building is referred to in its character
as an official and public building, and that, therefore, the place of sale is the
courthouse at the time of the foreclosure, rather than the place used for that
purpose at the time the mortgage is executed. This has been held even where
the courthouse was temporarily abandoned, as well as in cases where the
building was destroyed or permanently abandoned. The decisions, however,
are by no means in harmony. No general rule seems to have been laid down
fixing the place of sale when there has been a new location of the courthouse."

The court goes on to review some of the cases already
discussed, and continues:
"It will be seen, from an examination of these authorities, that the court
is in each instance endeavoring to ascertain the intention of the parties and
carry it into effect as to the place of sale, and that wherever there has been a
change of the location of the courthouse between the date of the execution of
the mortgage and the date of the sale the sale has been upheld, even though
at the new place, if it was fairly conducted, and no injury was shown to have
resulted from conducting it at such place. The power in the mortgage under
consideration declares that the sale shall be 'before the courthouse door in the
town of Isabella, Ga.' The question is whether it was the intention of the
parties that the sale should be held at the place for legal sales for Worth
County, or whether it was the intention that the sale should be at the town
of Isabella, without reference to whether legal sales were conducted at that
place. A sale could never be had in strict compliance with the power; for the
reason that at the date of the sale there was no courthouse door in the town
of Isabella. It may be that the old building formerly used was still there,
but it was no longer the courthouse of the county. It does not appear that
the land was situated in the town of Isabella, nor is there anything to indicate
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whether it was nearer the town of Isabella than to the city of Sylvester. It
would be a reasonable construction of the terms of the power that it was the
intention of the parties that the sale should be held at the county site, rather
than at the place which was no longer the place of holding sales for the county.
The use of the word 'courthouse' is significant. Isabella can be considered
as simply descriptive of the place where the courthouse was situated, and not
as the place designated for the sale. But the courthouse door is the place.
The courthouse door of Worth county was at the date of the sale in Sylvester.
We think the power was properly. executed by the sale at the courthouse door
of Worth county; that is, in the city of Sylvester."
MISSISSIPPI.

The last word on the subject is found in the case of Miller
v. Magnolia Building and Loan Association, 134 So. 136
(Miss. 1931), just recently decided. Here the trust deed provided for sale at the "East front door of the court house."
The notice for sale stated that the sale would take place "at
the front door of the county court house in Hinds county, at
Jackson, Miss." The deed of trust was given when the old
county court house was being occupied, and the main entrance or front door thereof fronted East, and all public or
judicial sales were made at the East front door thereof. Before the deed of trust in the case at bar became in default, and
before the sale was advertised, the new court -house was built
and occupied, and its main entrance faced north, the new
court house being built upon a different lot. The county
officers and courts had moved into the new court house.
It was contended that the sale being advertised as it was,
and the contract stipulating that the sale was to be made at
the east entrance of the county court house, confusion would
arise in the mind of bidders, and that they would fear to bid
because of the rule of strict construction which is applied to
sales en pais under deeds of trust, and the probability that the
property would not bring the amount of the debt, and that the
grantor in the deed of trust would suffer thereby and lose his
property; and, perhaps, suffer judgment for the balance due.
The court, in passing upon the questions involved, said:
"We are confronted with the purpose and meaning of the stipulation
in the contract. It appears that the dominant purpose of the stipulation is
to have the sale made at the courthouse, meaning the courthouse in existence
at the time the sale should be conducted, and that the provision as to the east
front door is a subordinate provision to the main dominant provision. It was
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manifestly the purpose of the parties to have the sale conducted at the courthouse, and at that part of the courthouse where similar sales were usually
made, and at such part where people generally entered the courthouse for
business purposes. It would be detrimental, rather than beneficial, to grantors,
to have the sale conducted on the east side of the new courthouse rather than
on the north side. The main entrance is where people generally enter a
courthouse.
"The provision as to time and place of sale, etc., was, of course, for the
benefit of both parties, but primarily for the property owner whose property
is to be sold. It is designed to make the property bring as high a price as a
public sale will afford; and, certainly, where people are liable to be when the
sale is to be made.
"We are satisfied that a sale at the north entrance complies with the
intent of the contract, although it does not strictly comply with the letter
in all respects. It does comply with the requirement that the sale be made
at the courthouse, and, as held before, this was manifestly the dominant idea
in conducting the sale. It, of course, meant a house where courts and county
officers are located and do business, rather than an abandoned building which
had formerly been held for court purposes and county offices, but where now
no public business is ever conducted."
COLORADO.

The Colorado courts have had one occasion to remark
upon the proper situs of a Trustee's sale. In the case of
Martin v. Barth, 4 Colo. App. 346, (1894), the court, in substance, held that where the Trustee was empowered to sell the
property at the front door of the court house, a sale fairly
made at a door of a building on the side named and in full
view of every other door on that side, although not at the door
leading to the court room, is not such a deviation as to invalidate an act otherwise regular.
CONCLUSION.

It occurs to me that while the decisions are not in complete harmony, the law is now sufficiently well settled to assure
that Public Trustee's sales made after occupancy of the new
building by our courts will be properly advertised and held
at the new situs, even though the trust deed specifies a sale
at the old Tremont Street door of our present court house.
While named the "Municipal Building", the new structure
will, in fact, be the court house when the courts have moved
in and are holding their sessions there. The law must be
practical in its interpretation of contracts. Parties to trust
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deeds naturally anticipate that a sale thereunder shall take
place at a public place where buyers are apt to congregate,
and where the greatest number of bidders will be present.
The door of the deserted court house could not fulfill such
a description. It is of first importance, however, that the
advertised notice of sale accurately describe the place of sale.
It would not be sufficient to advertise a sale at "the front door
of the courthouse", but the notice should be specific and in
no uncertain terms definitely describe the place where the sale
is to be made: for example, "the Main Bannock Street front
door of the Municipal Building at the Civic Center, in the
City and County of Denver, Colorado." Where the courts
move pending advertisement of notice for sale at the "Tremont
Street front door", the sale may take place where advertised,
so long as the old door of the courthouse is still well marked
and readily found, but it would be best in such a case for the
Public Trustee, on the morning of such a sale, to make public
announcement at the Tremont Street door that the sale would
be held at the Bannock Street door of the new building.
After the courts have moved and the municipal building becomes to all practical purposes the court house, all notices of
sale should name the main-front door of the new building,
and the sale should be held at that place.
As to sales now being advertised for, and made at, the
Tremont Street front door of the court house, such sales are
unquestionably valid, inasmuch as the trust deed provides for
a sale at that place, and, in addition thereto, the old structure
is still the "court house" and will continue to be such "court
house" so long as courts of general jurisdiction continue to
hold their sessions there.
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